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DEVELOPMENTS AND LIMITS IN
INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE'
PETER KOVACS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, it is hardly possible to deny the important role that the judicial
decisions of international tribunals play in the promotion and execution of states'
treaty law commitments, as well as those of international custom. It is commonly
admitted that modem international law cannot be understood without
acknowledging the paramount importance that scholars, judges, politicians (and
students during their exams) attribute to international courts.
But do we know exactly why courts choose to be innovative in certain cases
and why they are hesitant to do so in others? The reasoning of individual judges
is, in some respects, explained in their individual opinions, dissents, or advisory
opinions. Yet how can we reconstruct ex post facto a set of common
jurisprudential principles?
Interesting and deep analyses of individual cases are available in all the
important reviews of international law, and case-law-based commentaries are often
prepared on the proper interpretation of a major treaty or even on a particular
article of a given convention. That is why this article has no ambition to give an
exhaustive description of all the roots and paths of the evolution of international
jurisprudence. This article modestly summarizes only those which are most often
referred to in judgments and opinions.
Several different approaches can be chosen for the presentation of the most
important factors of jurisprudential development and limitations. I have chosen to
begin with legal sources (both written and unwritten) to arrive at an analysis of
reasoning beyond traditional legal factors.
1. The paper is a shortened summary of a larger report presented at the 36th annual conference of
the French Society for International Law organized under the somewhat odd title: La
Juridictionnalisation du Droit International (Jurisdictionalization of International Law). The collected
proceedings of the conference will be published by the Editions Pedone (Paris).
' Professor of international law at Miskolc University and Peter Pazmany Catholic University in
Hungary. In the fall semester of 2002 Mr. Kovacs was a visiting Fulbright professor at the University
of Denver College of Law where he taught classes on European protection of national minorities and
the law of war.
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II. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
A. Legal Factors in Jurisprudential Development
Jurisprudential development is engaged in, first and foremost, on a volunteer
basis. The will of the state, for example, may be manifested in contractual or ad
hoc public documents, but sometimes also in the act of only one of the state-
parties, and the international judge will usually take note of such expressions of
intent.
The statute of an international tribunal, a given article of a convention, or the
uncertain or contradictory nature of the terms of a treaty, can all be considered as
treaty-law bases for jurisprudential developments.
More specifically, a mandate contained in a treaty authorizing a tribunal to
deliver advisory opinions can a priori function as a good tool for jurisprudential
development. The Permanent Court of International Justice,2 the International
Court of Justice,3 and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights4 have often used
treaty mandates for this purpose. A specific example is the Commission of
Arbitration of the International Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia, chaired by the
president of the French Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter, which delivered a
good dozen advisory opinions during its brief existence. 5 Judges may also be
pushed towards jurisprudential development by the material, rather than by
procedural, clauses of a treaty, especially when it is thought necessary for judicial
decision-making.6
The elasticity of the terms of a treaty offer a good starting point. This
elasticity can be the product of a deliberate decision (the inclusion, for example, of
terms such as "economically reasonable efforts," or "in accordance with
environmental standards." French scholars refer to this as renoi mobil-literally,
"mobile reference") but it can also emerge nolens volens.7 It is obvious that the
inherent contradictions in treaty texts require a jurisprudential choice between the
hypothetically possible contents. There are a number of famous examples of a
2. The Permanent Court of International Justice has delivered twenty-seven advisory opinions.
See World Courts, Statistics on the Permanent Court of International Justice, available at
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
3. As of 2003, the International Court of Justice has issued twenty-two advisory opinions. See
id.
4. Sixteen advisory opinions were issued from 1981 to 2000. See Interamerican Court of Human
Rights, Judgments and Opinions, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr (last visited Mar. 1, 2003).
5. Fifteen advisory opinions and one "decision before jurisdiction.".
6. See South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Aft.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, at 336 (Dec. 21).
The International Court of Justice need not limit itself to mere grammatical interpretation because
"[t]his rule of interpretation is not an absolute one. Where such a method of interpretation results in a
meaning incompatible with the spirit, purpose and context of the clause or the instrument in which the
words are contained, no reliance can be validly placed on it." Id.
7. The use of such terms is generally the result of diplomatic compromises made during
multilateral negotiations in order to create mutually acceptable agreements.
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conflict between languages, and the International Court of Justice8 and the
European Court of Human Rights9 have both encountered such problems and both
resolved the issues according to the same general principles.
Treaty terms are often interpreted by recourse to preparatory documents
(travaux preparatoires), as described in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties,'0 and most jurisdictions generally consider this to be an important
method for arriving at a cleaner vision regarding obscure treaty terms." The
International Court of Justice, for example, has often profited from this method. 12
At the other end of the spectrum, the precise formulation of a given
convention does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of competent and
evolving interpretations in various jurisdictions. For example, in the context of the
Balkan tragedy, the International Court of Justice was faced with the task of
formulating the precise relationship between the crime of genocide as defined in
the 1948 Geneva Convention, and the national or international character of the
particular armed conflict in which the genocide occurred. The Court concluded
that the convention applied to the signatories regardless of the political backdrop
behind such crimes. 13
8. See, e.g., LaGrand (Germany v. United States) 2001 I.C.J. (June 27), available at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iqua/iqusjudgment/ijusijudgment_20010625.html. In the
LaGrand case, the International Court of Justice had to decide whether provisional measures adopted
according to article 41 of its Statute have a legally binding character (as suggested by the French text
"doivent etre prises" or the English text "ought to be taken") or not. The Court interpreted the provision
to be compulsory in nature, and closed a long doctrinal debate with its decision. Id. at §§ 100-09.
9. See, e.g., Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education
in Belgium, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 252, 284-85 (1968) (merits) [hereinafter Belgian Linguistic case,
merits]. In the Belgian linguistic case, the European Court of Human Rights had to pass on whether the
English ("without any discrimination") or the French version ("sans distinction aucune") of article 14 of
the European Convention of Human Rights better reflects the actual content of the non-discrimination
rule.
10. The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 32, available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/text/treaties (last visited Mar. 1, 2003). Article 32 states: "Supplementary
means of interpretation: Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion .... " Id.
11. See infra note 12.
12. LaGrand case, supra note 8, at §§ 105-07. An important aspect of the case concerned the legal
value (i.e., compulsory or only recommendatory) of the provisional measures ordered by the
International Court of Justice. The judgment explains extensively in these paragraphs how the
corresponding article of the Statue of the Permanent Court of International Justice was formulated; Fifty
lines are devoted to the presentation of the history of this formula and the metamorphosis of the original
proposal. Id.
13. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yug.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 615 (July 11). The Court explained:
[Tlhe Convention is applicable without reference to the circumstances linked to the
domestic or international nature of the conflict provided the acts to which it refers in
Article 11 and III have been perpetrated. In other words, irrespective of the nature of the
conflict forming the background to such acts, the obligations of prevention and
punishment which are incumbent upon the States parties to the Convention remain
identical.
Id.
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B. Jurisprudential Development Beyond Treaty Law Bases
It happens quite often that jurisprudence benefits from the existence of a
custom (or from the mere postulation of its existence) which is interpreted to
enlarge the spectrum of international law. The International Court of Justice,
developed, in part, from an analysis of certain terms of the 1969 treaty leading to a
presumption of the general representative nature of heads of state-a presumption
of their ability to act on behalf of a state concerning its international relations
which extends beyond mere treaty-making.' 4 However, as Judge Jimdnez de
Ardchaga noted not only positive customary law, but crystallizing custom can also
exercise a considerable influence on tribunals.'"
One could cite several examples of the influence of customs on treaties and
vice versa, but the best-known instance of a comprehensive development is the
confirmation of the applicability of the story of Sleeping Beauty on codified
custom. For example, without the recognition of the autonomous existence of
codified customary rules, the International Court of Justice would hardly have been
able to decide the dispute between Nicaragua and the United States.'
6
Do other such considerations constitute sufficient bases for a judge to
formulate new jurisprudential development? It is undeniable that international
jurisprudence-as well as international doctrinal approaches-does not necessarily
ignore factors like philosophy, even if they appear to be of importance only rarely.
The use of principles of equity provides a well-recognized exception.1
7
Obviously, the less someone is limited, the freer he is. Consequently, judges
feel the greatest freedom where a decision is to be taken ex aequo et bono.' 8
14. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yug.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 622 (July 11). The Court observed that
"[aiccording to international law, there is no doubt that every Head of Sate is presumed to be able to act
on behalf of the State in their international relations." Id.
15. See, e.g., Eduardo Jimdnez de Ar6chaga, International Law in the Past Third of a Century,
159 RECUEIL DES Coups 20 (1978). Ardchaga observes a willingness, in the International Court of
Justice, to rely on generally accepted principles of international law existing outside textual
circumscription:
[lit may be asserted that the International Court of Justice has, in the last decade made a
significant contribution to the evolution of a more flexible concept of the source of
customary international law, based on the recognition of an established consensus of
State and irrespective of the formal requirements of adoption of a text, signature and
ratification of a convention. The Court gave considerable weight to what it termed "the
general consensus revealed" at the Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea "which had crystallized as customary law in recent years," on the basis of
subsequent practice of States.
Id.
16. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 96 (June 27). In this
case, the Court explained, "[i]t will therefore be clear that customary international law continues to exist
and to apply, separately from international treaty law, even where the two categories of law have an
identical content." Id.
17. See infra note 25 for examples of the International Court of Justice discussing the concept of
equity.
18. See Wolfgang Friedmann, General Course in Public International Law, 127 RECUEIL DES
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However, neither the Permanent Court of International Justice, nor the
International Court of Justice have ever felt such freedom in delivering a
judgment, 19 and the same can be said of most international tribunals. 20 The very
few examples to the contrary are not very convincing. In these cases, the existence
of a mandate to pass a decision ex aequo was never truly clear and certainly not
express. 21 Indeed, the related decisions are very short and their formulation is
often lacking a proper legal argument, or even a written opinion. As such, they
seem not to be judicial decisions so much as amalgams of social, sociological,
geographical and ethnic considerations.
Grosso modo, the same considerations can be evoked in order to explaih why
states are reluctant when deciding upon a mandate in favor of an international
tribunal for a transactional decision. This theoretical possibility apparently does
not avail too much of a chance for jurisprudential development.22
However, the use of analogy and general principles of law has contributed
largely to jurisprudential development. 23 Though it is sometimes criticized in
academic circles because of its seemingly indefinable character,24 equity has not
been abandoned as a component of jurisprudence. Scholars have observed and
appreciated the presence of equity in the reasoning of tribunals and consequently,
COURS 159 (1969). Friedmann explains the concept in holistic terms:
What ex aequo et bono means is that the Court should, by agreement of the parties, look
at the whole matter in the light of the appropriate economic, geographical, racial,
religious and other circumstances which would seem conducive to a fair and lasting
solution. And such a decision may involve the modification of legal rights, e.g., of
boundaries established by previous treaties or annexations, or colonial occupations.
Freidmann, supra, at 159.
19. See Robert Yewdall, General Course on Principles of International Law, 121 RECUEIL DES
COURs 343-44 (1967). Yewdall has observed, "[it is not surprising, therefore, that this is a much
underworked provision of the Statute; for it is inherently unlikely that in any case both parties will be
found willing to seek a decision which may be at odds with the legal rights of a party." Id.
20. See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
21. See generally the text of the Vienna Award of August 30th, 1940, ceding the territory of
Transylvania to Hungary, reprinted in Rumanian-Hungarian Frontier, 3 Whiteman DIGEST § 12, at
138-39. See also the very short text of the Ribbentrop-Ciano awards in Hungarian-Czechoslovak
Frontier, 3 Whiteman DIGEST § 13, at 145-47.
22. See generally the Arbitral Tribunal for Dispute over Inter-Entity Boundary in the Brcko Area,
Final Award, Mar. 5, 1999, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/990305_arbiter brcko.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2003).
23. See, e.g., Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 at 29 (Sept. 13). Here,
the Court explained, "It is a general conception of law that every violation of an engagement involves
an obligation to make reparation." Id. See also Advisory Opinion No. 6, German Settlers in Poland,
1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 6, at 36. In this case, the Court observed, "[i]t can hardly be maintained that
although the law survived, private rights acquired under it perished. Such a contention is based on no
principle and would be contrary to an almost universal opinion and practice." Id. See also Corfu
Channel (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 18 (Apr. 9) ("Indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law
and its use is recognized by international decisions."); Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1954 I.C.J. 47, 53 (July 13) ("According to a well-established
and generally recognized principle of law, a judgment rendered by such a judicial body is resjudicata
and has binding force between the parties to the dispute.").
24. See, e.g., PROSPER WEIL, PERSPECTIVES DU DROIT DE LA DELIMITATION MARITIME 147
(1988). Weil has characterized equity as a "jeu de hazard" (hazardous game). Id.
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an impressive jurisprudential construction [concerning equity?] has been created,
25particularly in the law of sea.
Yet it is without any doubt that the simplest and most often observed method
of rendering progressive, activist developments in international law is through the
cascade of successive jurisprudential decisions.
To refer to formerly pronounced dicta, and to profit from their existence in
order to go a bit further is a well known and maybe the most often employed
method of jurisprudential development. It is rooted also in inherent judicial
functions, recognized in the European literature by the German phrase
"Kompetenz-Kompetenz" or the more or less similar Latin principle jura novit
curia. The judgments passed in Nicaragua v. United States26 and the Fisheries
27Competencies cases provide examples. The same doctrine can also play an
important role in the field of advisory opinions; from their larger circle, let us cite
only the opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in order to
demonstrate the International Court of Justice's adoption of this prerogative.28
May it sound exaggerated to call it a stricto sensu development, it is worth
noting that a tribunal can proprio motu pass a decision on issues or aspects of
25. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 49 (Feb. 20) ("Equity does not
necessarily imply equality."); Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 60
(Feb. 24) ("Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose task
is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it."); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 39 (June 3) ("Thus the justice of which equity is an emanation, is not an
abstract justice according to the rule of law; which is to say that its application should display
consistency and a degree of predictability .. ") [hereinafter cases concerning continental shelves].
26. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicr. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 24 (June 27) ("For the
purpose of deciding whether the claim is well founded in law, the principle jura novit curia signifies
that the Court is not solely dependent on the argument of the parties before it with respect to the
applicable law ... ").
27. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 9 (July 25). The Court explained:
The Court, however, as an international judicial organ, is deemed to take judicial notice of international
law, and is therefore required ... to consider on its own initiative all the rules of international law
which may be relevant to the settlement of the dispute. It being the duty of the Court itself to ascertain
and apply the relevant law in the given circumstances of the case, the burden of establishing or proving
rules of international law cannot be imposed upon any of the parties, for the law lies within the judicial
knowledge of the Court.
Id. See also Fisheries Jurisdiction (Ger. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175, 181 (July 25) (employing the same
language).
28. See Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 237 (July 8). In
section 18 of the opinion, the Court explained:
It is clear that the Court cannot legislate and in the circumstances of the present case, it is
not called upon to do so. Rather its task is to engage in its normal judicial function of
ascertaining the existence or otherwise of legal principles and rules applicable to the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. The contention that the giving of an answer to the
question posed would require the Court to legislate is based on a supposition that the
present corpus juris [sic] is devoid of relevant rules in this matter. The Court could not
accede to this argument. It states the existing international law and does not legislate.
This is so even if in stating and applying the law, the Court necessarily has to specify its
scope and sometimes note its general trend.
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minimal importance even when the question is not explicitly mentioned in the
29compromise.
Additionally, the statutory position of a tribunal within the structure of an
international organization can have a considerable effect on its reasoning, as judges
must place the legal dispute or the legal problem in the general framework of an
international organization, either universal or regional. The due consideration of
the functional interests of the organization as well as its capacities can exercise an
important influence on the procedure of judicial decision-making as well. For
example, the functional interests of the United Nations and in particular the role
and the position of the International Court of Justice in this context were pointed
out by Elihu Lauterpacht.30 The determination of the legal personality of the
United Nations in the Bernadotte case,3' the capacities of its organs in the Certain
32Expenses case, and the assessment of its organs in the South West African and
Namibia cases 33 are all examples of the phenomenon.
29. CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES, Vol. 2 1631-32 (2d. rev. ed., 1945). In the context of an arbitral award, Hyde
observes that collateral matters may be determined by the tribunal, even where there is no explicit
authorization to do so from the parties. For example:
It is perhaps unnecessary that the agreement to arbitrate should prescribe the currency in
which the terms of an award are to be expressed, even though it be highly important that
the amount thereof be fixed with precision and set forth in terms that leave no room for
doubt as to the extent of the fiscal burden imposed upon the respondent.
Id.
30. Elihu Lauterpacht, 152 RECUEIL DES COURs 466 (1976). Lauterpacht explains:
We are bound to ask whether the treatment by the Court of questions relating to
international organizations-and especially the interpretation of their constitutions-
represents a deliberate or consistent attempt to develop a systematic approach to the law
of international organization as such. Or, is it, on the other hand, nothing more than an
accumulation of judicial episodes which share the common feature of being founded
upon facts of an "organizational" character and which happens only accidentally or
haphazardly to shed light on the legal system of international organization?
Id.
31. See generally Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 185-87 (Apr. 11).
32. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20). In this
advisory opinion, the Court observed:
[W]hen the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was
appropriate for the fulfillment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires... [1]f the action was taken by the
wrong organ, it was irregular as a matter of that internal structure, but this would not
necessarily mean that the expense incurred was not the expense of the organization.
Id.
33. See generally International Status of South West Africa, 1959 I.C.J. 128 (July I1);
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 l.C.J. 23 (June
1); Voting Procedure on Questions relating to Reports and Petitions concerning the Territory of South
West Africa, 1955 I.C.J. 67 (June 7). See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa and Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16 (June 21). In this case the Court assessed the competency of the United Nations to supervise its own
various organs. The Court observed, "[Tihe United Nations, as a successor to the League, acting
through its competent organs, must be seen above all as the supervisory institution, competent to
pronounce, in that capacity, on the conduct of the mandatory with respect to its international
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In order to respect the principle of res judicata, great attention must be paid to
the scrupulous observance of prior decisions passed in the same case. However
this does not mean that mathematical errors should not be corrected34 -even if a
pure arithmetical correction cannot really be taken as a true jurisprudential
development. The Permanent Court of International Justice was formally
mandated to correct ex officio minor mistakes, and the existence of an analogous
competence is presumed for the International Court of Justice, despite silence on
the issue in the statute creating the court.
The phenomena of individual jurisprudential developments can be viewed as
bricks used in the progressive construction of a building. This happened most
obviously in the development the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice concerning the law of sea, the crime of genocide, or the norms erga omnes
(jus cogens).36 Often, a judgment can finalize the slow, continuous and consequent
evolution of international custom-a custom eventually linked to a particular treaty
law question.
Clearly, previous dicta enjoy an irrefutable authority in the formulations of
later judgments by the same court. It is interesting, however, to observe not only a
tribunal's utilization of its own historical jurisprudence, but also the effects on an
international tribunal of the judgments of other international tribunals. For
purposes of the present article, I will call this phenomenon jurisprudential
interactions, mindful that in reality we cannot speak about truly mutual
interactions, the general feeling among tribunals being a certain unilateralism
accompanied by judicial aristocratism. Still, this phenomenon merits a closer look.
obligations, and competent to act accordingly. Id.
34. HYDE, supra note 29, at 1635. Hyde quotes Arbitrator Roberts:
I think it clear that where the Commission has misinterpreted the evidence, or made a
mistake in calculation, or where its decision does not follow its fact findings, or where in
any other respect the decision does not comport with the record as made, or where the
decision involves a material error of law, the Commission not only has power, but is
under the duty, upon a proper showing, to reopen and correct a decision to accord with
the facts and applicable legal rules.
Id.
35. See Richard Plender, Procedure in the European Court: Comparisons and Proposals, 267
RECUEIL DES CouRs 304 (1997). Plender notes that despite the lack of an explicit delineation of its
power to correct simple errors, the Court is, nevertheless, presumed to be able to do so. He observes:
It is a curiosity that between 1931 and 1936 the Permanent Court (or the President if the
Court was not sitting) was formally provided with a power to correct any error in any
judgment, opinion or order arising from a slip or accidental omission. Although
thereafter neither the Rules of the Permanent Court nor those of the International Court
of Justice expressly stipulated such a power, there is no doubt that the International
Court of Justice has an inherent power to rectify clerical errors or slips of the
hypothetical pen without invoking its revision jurisdiction under article 61 of the Statute.
Id.
36. See generally North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20); Continental Shelf (Tunis.
v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Feb. 24); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v.
Malta) 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28); Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28); Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power Company
(BeIg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
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In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights we can find a
good dozen references to cases decided by the Permanent Court of International
Justice 37 or the International Court of Justice.38 It is true however that the ratio of
such references compared to the total number (over three thousand) of judgments
from the European Court of Human Rights is very lOW.
39
37. See, e.g., Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, I
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 241, 247 (1970) (preliminary objections) [hereinafter Belgian Linguistic case,
preliminary objections] ("[H]aving regard to the decisions of the Permanent Court of International
Justice and the International Court of Justice, the Belgian Government contends that the European
Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on the merits of this case..."); Belgian Linguistic case, merits,
supra note 9. In the decision on the merits, the Court referred expressly to the jurisprudence of both the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice:
In its opinion of 24th of June 1965, the Commission expressed the view that although
Article 14 is not at all applicable to the rights and freedoms not guaranteed by the
Convention and Protocol, its applicability "is not limited to cases in which there is an
accompanying violation of another Article." In the view of the Commission "such a
restrictive application" would conflict with the principle of effectiveness established by
the case law of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court
of Justice, for the discrimination would be limited to the aggravation "of the violation of
another provision of the Convention."
Id. at 277.
See also Lawless v. Ireland, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 7 (1960) (preliminary objections) ("The
Commission has invoked various precedents drawn from advisory opinion procedure at the Permanent
Court of International Justice and subsequently at the International Court of Justice .. "); Stran Greek
Refineries v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293, 329. (1994) (Court report). Here, to
support its proposition that the unilateral termination of a contract cannot effect certain clauses of that
contract (such as an arbitration clause) the court cited the Losinger decision of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (Losinger & Co. v. Yug., 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 78, at 110 (Oct. 1I).). See also
Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 452 (1996) (Commission
report) (citing the Chorzow Factory case, infra note 40).
38. See, e.g., Lawless v. Ireland, I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), supra note 37, at 7; Belgian Linguistic
case, preliminary objections, supra note 37, at 247 ("[H]aving regard to the decisions of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, the Belgian Government contends
that the European Court has no jurisdiction to pronounce on the merits of this case..."); Belgian
Linguistic case, merits, supra note 10, at 277 ("In the view of the Commission, 'such a restrictive
application' would conflict with the principle of effectiveness established by the case law of the
Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice.. ."); Ringeisen v.
Austria, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 455, 498 (1971) ("Like the International Court of Justice, 'it is the
duty' of our Court 'to interpret the Treaties, not to revise them."'); Cruz Varas v. Sweden, App. No.
15576/89, 14 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 40-41 (1991) (Commission report) ("The European Movement, which
first proposed the drafting of a European Convention on Human Rights, originally included in a draft
Statue of the European Court of Human Rights an interim measures provision (Article 35) based in
substance on Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice."); Loizidou v. Turkey, App.
No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 103 (1995) (Commission report) (discussing both differences and
similarities in the nature of the two courts); Agrotexim v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, 21 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 250, (1995) (Court report) ("The Supreme Courts of certain Member States of the Council of
Europe have taken the same line. The principle has also been confirmed with regard to the diplomatic
protection of companies by the International Court of Justice."); Cyprus v. Turkey, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep.
731, 737 (2001) ("Moreover, recognising the effectiveness of those bodies for the limited purpose of
protecting the rights of the territory's inhabitants does not, in the Court's view and following the
Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, legitimise the TRNC in any way.").
39. The European Court of Human Rights counts 3,499 judgments as of February 2003. See the
European Court of Human Rights, list of recent judgments, at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (last visited
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The European Court of Human Rights refers namely to the Chorzow40 and
Losinger4' cases of the Permanent Court of International Justice and some famous
arbitral awards.42 From the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice,
Strasbourg judges cited, for example, the judgment in the Barcelona Traction
case43 and the 1971 advisory opinion on Namibia."
It is also interesting to observe that several times, the European Court of
Human Rights has refused to follow the direction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice or of the International Court of Justice, usually in cases
containing differences between the important aspects of the affairs.45
When the European Court of Human Rights refers proprio motu to the
jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice or to that of the
International Court of Justice, it usually follows their direction. On occasion, the
plaintiff, the respondent government or the European Commission of Human
Rights has suggested that the court follow this or that dictum. In such instances,
the European Court of Human Rights has scrupulously examined the relevance of
the work of other tribunals before adopting any of their positions. 46
Concerning the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, we can refer inter
alia to its recent judgments in the Last Temptation of Christ case (after the 1988
Martin Scorsese film of the same title, which was banned from release in Chile),
and the Ivcher Bronstein cases. In the first case, the judges of the court made
reference to the well-developed jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights in the field of freedom of expression. 47 In the second, the Inter-American
Feb. 17, 2003).
40. See, e.g., Papamichalopoulos v. Greece, App. No. 14556/89, 21 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439, 452
(quoting the holding of the Chorzow Factory case).
41. See, e.g., Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, App. No. 13427/87, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 293, 329
(1994) (Court report) (referring to the Losinger decision).
42. See Stran Greek Refineries v. Greece, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 329 (referring to Lena Golfields v.
Soviet Government and Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v.
Government of the Libyan Arab Republic).
43. See Agrotexim v. Greece, App. No. 14807/89, Eur. H.R. Rep. 250, 271 (1995) (Commission
report) (citing the rules of diplomatic protection for shareholders and societies).
44. See Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, 113 (1995) (Commission
report).
45. See e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 182 (1996) (Court
report) (declining to follow principles enunciated in the Interhandel and Ambatielos judgments
concerning exceptions from the rule requiring exhaustion of local remedies).
46. For examples of the Court accepting principles delineated by other tribunals see the Belgian
Linguistic case, preliminary objections, supra note 37, at 247; Belgian Linguistic case, merits, supra
note 9, at 284-85. For an example of the Court refusing, despite the urging of the respondent
government, to adopt the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice see Akdivar v. Turkey,
supra note 46.
47. See The Last Temptation of Christ Case (Olmedo Bustos v. Chile), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.er (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). In section 69 of the judgment, the Court quoted
the European Court of Human Rights itself:
[The] supervisory function [of the Court] signifies that [it] must pay great attention to
the principles inherent in a "democratic society." Freedom of expression constitutes one
of the essential bases of such a society, one of the primordial conditions for its progress
VOL. 31:3
2003 DEVELOPMENTS AND LIMITS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 471
Court of Human Rights recalled the jurisprudence of the International Court of
Justice with an apparent allusion to the Barcelona Traction case, though without
mentioning the case expressly.
48
And vice versa?
The European Court of Human Rights appears to have adopted the
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in order to find
support for its thesis on the responsibility of the plaintiff concerning the burden of
proof of the nonexistence or inefficacy of a remedy existing ex lege. 49 In another
case, the plaintiffs explicit reference to an Inter-American case was not
addressed. 50
If we examine the tendency of the International Court of Justice to cite the
dicta of other international tribunals, we can conclude that the attention of the
judges of the World Court is focused mostly on the jurisprudence of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and some arbitral awards. Apparently, the
International Court of Justice was more reluctant to profit from the dicta of the
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or
the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia. Three judges have referred,
however, to the Strasbourg jurisprudence in their dissenting opinions. 5'
Importing the principle uti possidetis juris to Europe, the Commission of
Arbitration for Peace in Yugoslavia also profited from the heritage of the
and for the development of man. Article 10.2 [of the European Court of Human Rights]
is valid not only for the information or ideas that are favorably received or considered
inoffensive or indifferent but also for those that shock, concern or offend the State or any
sector of the population. Such are the requirements of pluralism, tolerance and the spirit
of openness without which no "democratic society" can exist. This means that any
formality, condition, restriction or sanction imposed in that respect, should be
proportionate to the legitimate aim sought. Also, those who exercise their freedom of
expression assume "obligations and responsibilities," the scope of which depends on the
context and the technical procedure used.
Id.
48. The text of the Ivacher Bronstein decision is available at
http://mitglied.lycos.de/harueckner/art2lachr. In section 121 of the judgment, the Court explained,
"[tihe International Court of Justice has made a distinction between the rights of a company's
shareholders from those of the company itself." Id.
49. See, e.g., Akdivar v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 182 (1996) (Court
report). The European Court of Human Rights referred to both the Velasquez Rodrigues case (1987)
and the Advisory Opinion of 10 August 1990 on the Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic
Remedies, though not explicitly.
50. See Ergi v. Turkey, App. No. 23818/94, 32 Eur. H.R. Rep. 388, 426 (1998). The plaintiff
referred to sections 136 and 140-41 of the judgment in Godinez Cruz v. Honduras, decided by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights in 1989.
51. See Fisheries Jurisdiction, (Spain v. Can.), 1998 I.C.J. 432 (Dec. 4). Judge Bedjaoui, in his
dissenting opinion, referred to the Interhandel case when emphasizing the importance of the principle of
divisibility of the reservations. Id. at 539-40. Similarly, Judge Torres Bernardez referred to the
Loizidou case in his dissent. Id. at 637. See also Ariel Incident of 10 August 1999 (Pak. v. India), 2000
I.C.J. 12, 85 (June 21) (citing Belilos v. Switzerland, decided by the European Court of Human Rights
in 1988, and Loizidou v. Turkey).
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International Court of Justice52 when it pronounced on the borders of the ex-
Yugoslav states.53
However surprising it may be, the International Tribunal for the Law of Sea
has referred rarely to the decisions of the International Court of Justice. Among its
references, we can find classical dicta 54(as well as well known arbitral awards55)
and newly pronounced judgments,56 but surprisingly none of these decisions
concerned the law of the sea. The Tribunal generally cited its own dicta57 -which
is not really surprising.
Another example presents itself in the decisions of international criminal
tribunals. Referring instead to the Nuremberg jurisprudence,58 the International
52. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 565 (Dec. 22). The Court
explained the principle as follows:
[T]he principle is not a special rule which pertains solely to one specific system of
international law. It is a general principle which is logically connected with the
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is
to prevent the independence and stability of new sates being endangered by fratricidal
struggles.
Id.
For an in-depth discussion on the Badinter Commission, see generally STEVE TERRETT, THE
DISSOLUTION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE BADINTER ARBITRATION COMMISSION: A CONTEXTUAL
STUDY OF PEACE-MAKING EFFORTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD.
53. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1448, 1500 (1992). The Commission referred explicitly to the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice concerning the principle of utipossidetis:
Except where otherwise agreed, the former boundaries become frontiers protected by
international law. This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the territorial
status quo and in particular from the principle of uti possidetis. Uti possidetis, though
initially applied in settling decolonization issues in America and Africa, is today
recognized as a general principle, as stated by the International Court of Justice in its
judgment of 22 December 1986 in the case between Burkina Faso and Mali.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Saiga Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M 1323, 1349 (1999). In section 120 of
the judgment the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea cited the Permanent Court of
International Justice's decision in the case concerning Certain German interests in Polish Upper Silesia.
Id. Additionally, in section 170 of the judgment, the Tribunal refers to the Chorzow case. See also
Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), 38 I.L.M. 1624 (1999). Here, the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea charactarized a legal dispute according to the terminology adopted by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavromattis Palestine Concessions judgment of
1962 ("[A] dispute is a 'disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of
interests."'). See also Grand Prince, (Belize v. Fr.), available at http://www.itlosorg/start2_eng.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2003). The Tribunal referred to the dictum of the case concerning the
Competencies of the Council of the ICAO, explaining, "[tihe Court must however always be satisfied
that it has jurisdiction and must if necessary go into that matter, proprio motu." Id.
55. See Saiga Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M 1323, 1355 (1999). Section 156 of the
judgment refers to the lam Alone (1935) and Red Crusader (1962) cases. Id.
56. See id. at 1351-52. Section 133 of the judgment refers to the case concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project. Id.
57. See, e.g., Camouco Case (Pan. v. Fr.) 39 I.L.M. 666 (2000) (citing the Saiga case); Monte
Confunco (Sey. v. Fr.), available at http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. (citing the Comouco case in
sections 41 and 63).
58. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment
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Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, for example, not only failed to observe the
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice in the dispute between
Nicaragua and the United States,59 but purposefully distanced itself from the
International Court of Justice. 60
We cannot say that recourse to auxiliary documents of compromises or to the
memoranda of the parties to the dispute has contributed in a consistent or decisive
manner to jurisprudential development. On the contrary, the picture is quite
contradictory especially concerning the value attributed to geographical maps.
But only due to the factum concludens of the parties, the International Court of
Justice can take note of maps even if "in [their] inception and at the moment of
[their] production, [they] had no binding character.",61 The Court seems to reason
that "maps merely constitute information... [and] by virtue solely of their
existence they cannot constitute a territorial title ... [though] in some cases, maps
may acquire ... legal force ... [as] physical expressions of the will of the State or
States concerned., 62 However, in the case of the "uncertainty and inconsistency of
the cartographic material submitted," the International Court of Justice can decline
to give weight to such materials. 63 Arbitral practice is slightly more open.64
Soft law-the resolutions adopted by the organs of different organizations-
has also fermented international jurisprudence. By opening the door to the
possible contribution of such resolutions to the formation of general norms of
international law, the International Court of Justice has manifested its willingness
in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, and Dissenting Opinion, 36 I.L.M. 908, 936 (1997) ("the Trial of the
Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal ('Ntlmberg Judgment') does not delve
into the legality of the inclusion of crimes against humanity in the Narnberg Charter .... ').
59. See id. at 927.
60. See id. at 927-28. The Commission was careful to distinguish the facts of the Nicaragua case
from the case before it:
However, the facts of the Nicaragua case and this case are very different... thus, unlike
the Nicaragua case in which the Court considered whether the contra forces had, over
time, fallen into such a sufficient state of dependency and control vis-a-vis the United
States that the acts of one could be imputed to another, the question for this Trial
Chamber is whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), by its
withdrawal from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
notwithstanding its continuing support for the VRS, had sufficiently distanced itself from
the VRS so that those forces could not be regarded as de facto organs or agents of the VJ
and hence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
Consequently, the Trial Chamber must consider the essence of the test of the relationship
between a de facto organ or agent, as a rebel force, and its controlling entity or principal,
as a foreign Power. It must also be shown that the VJ and Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exercised the potential for control inherent in that
relationship of dependency.
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment in
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, and Dissenting Opinion, supra note 58, at 927-28.
61. Temple of Preah Vihear, (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 21 (June 15).
62. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali) 1986 I.C.J. 554, 581 (Dec. 22).
63. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1100 (Dec. 13) ("[uln light of
the uncertainty and inconsistency of the cartographic material submitted to it, the Court considers itself
unable to draw conclusions from the map evidence produced in this case.").
64. See generally Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India v. Pak.), 7 I.L.M. 633 (1968).
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to take into account changes implied by the new world-order. The reference to
United Nations Resolution 2625 on the principles of co-existence and friendly
relations adopted by the General Assembly is a good example.65 The soft law of the
protection of the environment has also contributed to a new jurisprudential
response to contemporary challenges, as is reflected by the inclusion of terms used
in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration in one of the orders of the International Court
of Justice. 66
The contribution of the acts of parties to jurisprudential development can be
found in several judgments as well. The International Court of Justice has
explained that "the views of the parties to a case as to the law applicable to their
dispute are very material, particularly ... when those views are concordant. '67 For
example, in the Kasikili-Sedudu case,68 the International Court of Justice concurred
with the observation by Namibia and Botswana, of the jurisprudential line
concerning the boundaries as was formulated in the Preah Vihear case.69 Mutatis
mutandis this can be seen also in the advisory opinions vis-A-vis the position-
papers submitted by states.70
B. Non-legal reasons ofjurisprudential development
Social necessity or changes in global context can also influence international
65. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (June 27).
The Court explained:
[O]piniojuris may, though with all due caution, be deduced from, inter alia the attitude
of the Parties and of the States towards certain General Assembly Resolutions and
particularly resolution 2625 (XXV)... The effect of consent to the text of such
resolutions cannot be understood as merely that of 'reiteration or elucidation' of treaty
commitment undertaken in the Charter. On the contrary, it may be understood as an
acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by the resolutions
themselves.
Id.
66. See Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the
Court's Judgment of 20 December 1974 (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1995 I.C.J. 288, 306 (Sept. 22) ("Whereas
moreover [sic] the present order is without prejudice to the obligations of States to respect and protect
the natural environment, obligations to which both New Zealand and France have in the present
instance reaffirmed their commitment ... ").
For a deep analysis of the environmental issue in the Court's jurisprudence see SANDS, PHILIPPE:
L'AFFAIRE DES ESSAIS NUCLEAIRES 11 (NOUVELLE-ZELANDE C. FRANCE): CONTRIBUTION DE
L' INSTANCE AU DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LENVIRONNEMENT RGDIP 1997/2 473-74.
67. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 25 (June 27).
68. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045 (Dec. 13)
69. See id. at 1073 ("The Court stated in the Temple of Preah Vihear Case... this was 'an
obvious and convenient way of describing a frontier line objectively, though in general terms."').
70. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia,
1971 I.C.J. 16, 45 (June 21). The Court explained:
Undoubtedly, the Court does not possess powers of judicial review or appeal in respect
of the decisions taken by the United Nations' organs concerned .... However, in the
exercise of its judicial function and since objections have been advanced, the Court, in
the course of its reasoning, will consider these objections before determining any legal
consequences arising from those resolutions. Id.
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tribunals to refine their jurisprudence. 7'
We sometimes have the feeling that a tribunal in a given case was answering a
historical challenge, though it is true that courts acknowledge this kind of
reasoning with exceptional rarity. These are, however, very important moments in
the history of mankind-moments when the courts do not merely deliver justice,
but also reaffirm the notion that justice is triumphant. In these instances, the
tribunal cannot afford to be criticized for having allegedly committed an abuse of
power or denial of justice. Quite plainly, this feeling is perceptible in the work of
international criminal tribunals. The International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg,
for example, scrupulously summarized the number of witnesses, affidavits, and
testimonies (with a special regard to those advocating for the defense) in the
introductory portion of the judgment. 72 The Tribunal pointed out that "from the
beginning of the War in 1939 War Crimes were committed on a vast scale, which
were also Crimes against Humanity. 73  In the context of the tragedy of the
Balkans, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Formal Yugoslavia was
confronted with the same challenge and it referred, logically, to the heritage of the
Nuremberg judgment.74
71. See, e.g., Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226. In this advisory
opinion, the Court considered the overarching social context surrounding the law governing nuclear
weapons:
Given the eminently difficult issues that arise in applying the law on the use of force and
above all the law applicable in armed conflict to nuclear weapons, the Court considers
that it now needs to examine one further aspect of the question before it, seen in a
broader context. In the long run, international law, and with it the stability of the
international order which it is intended to govern, are bound to suffer from the
continuing difference of views with regard to the legal status of weapons as deadly as
nuclear weapons. It is consequently important to put an end to this state of affairs: the
long-promised complete nuclear disarmament appears to be the most appropriate means
of achieving that result.
Id.
72. See The Avalon Project at Yale Law School: Judgment of the International Military Tribunal
for the Trial of Major War Criminals, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/judgen.htm (last
visited Mar. 5, 2003). The prosecution offered the testimony of thirty-three witnesses, and the defense
sixty-one witnesses. The defense also offered additional testimony in the form of 143 written answers
to interrogatories. Specially appointed Commissioners heard the testimony of another 101 witnesses,
and a total of 1,809 affidavits were submitted.
73. "Ntmberg Judgment," infra note 82, at 254.
74. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment in
Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, and Dissenting Opinion, 36 I.L.M. 908, 936 (1997). The Tribunal
acknowledged the reasoning behind the inclusion, in the Namberg charter, of jurisdictional provisions
allowing authorities to deal with nontraditional crimes against humanity:
The decision to include crimes against humanity in the Ntrmberg Charter and thus grant
the Ntrmberg Tribunal jurisdiction over this crime resulted from the Allies' decision not
to limit their retributive powers to those who committed war crimes in the traditional
sense but to include those who committed other serious crimes that fall outside the ambit
of traditional war crimes, such as crimes where the victim is stateless, has the same
nationality as the perpetrator, or that of a state allied with that of the perpetrator. The
origins of this decision can be found in assertions made by individual governments, the
London International Assembly and the United Nations War Crimes Commission.
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International tribunals are not separated artificially from the social realities
which influence and develop their jurisprudence. In other words, we must examine
the underlying exigencies of the times in order to gain a complete understanding of
the work of such tribunals. 7
The question is, of course, how to identify the moment when international
tribunals should feel the necessity to react to such exigencies. Arguably, both
national and international judges should pay due attention to the social
acceptability of their decisions. This dilemma is similar-according to Reisman,
who addressed the influence of social forces on the advisory opinion concerning
the 1947 peace treaties-to "navigating Scylla and Charybdis."7 6
The issue of the objective legal personality of the United Nations,77 the law of
the sea,78 or the growing importance attributed nowadays to environmental
protection 79 are also representative examples of that judicial phenomenon in the
75. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 178
(Apr. 11). The International Court of Justice took the same view, arguing that "[t]hroughout its history,
the development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life." Id.
76. Michel Reisman, The Supervisory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice:
International Arbitration and International Adjudication, 258 RECUEIL DES CoURS 135 (1996).
77. See, e.g., Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174
(Apr. 11) ("[F]ifty States, representing the vast majority of the international community, had the power,
in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international
personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone.").
78. See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 47 (Feb. 24)
("The Court must thus turn to the question whether principles and rules of international law ... may be
derived or may be affected by the 'new accepted trends' which have emerged at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.").
79. See, e.g., Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 237 (July 8). In
its advisory opinion on the use of nuclear weapons, the Court explicitly recognized the importance of
environmental considerations:
The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threat and that the use of
nuclear weapons could constitute a catastrophe for the environment. The Court also
recognizes that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The
existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the
environment. Id.
See also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 67-68 (Sept. 25). The Court,
in this case, emphasized environmental concerns in its assessment of the treaty governing certain
aspects of the plan to develop and operate the Gabcikovo Nagymaros dam:
[T]he Court wishes to point out that newly developed norms of environmental
law are relevant for the implementation of the Treaty and that the parties could,
by agreement, incorporate them through the application of Articles 15, 19 and 20
of the Treaty. These articles do not contain specific obligations of performance
but require the parties, in carrying out their obligations to ensure that the quality
of water in the Danube is not impaired and that nature is protected, to take new
environmental norms into consideration when agreeing upon the means to be
specified in the Joint Contractual Plan... the Treaty is not static, and is open to
adapt to emerging norms of international law.
1d.
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jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice. The dicta of the Commission
of Arbitration of the Peace Conference of Yugoslavia about the jus cogens nature
of the principle of the protection of minorities 80 were pronounced in a particular
period of history when several famous diplomatic and political brainstorming
centers were working to advocate the principles of preventative rather than
curative law. Governmental offices suggested that direction in order to avoid the
outbreak of a bloody conflict. With the pronouncement of their thesis on jus
cogens, Robert Badinter and his co-arbiters certainly made a historical step
forward, even if the court's decision did not fully embrace their ideals.
The expectations of the public also show some similarities with the
phenomenon of the exigencies of the times explored above. These expectations
were certainly perceptible in the condemnation of nazi war criminals and were
undoubtedly present in the creation of two contemporary penal tribunals-the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda-and the litigation before them.8' Even if one can
find a huge complex of considerations formulated sine ira et studio, one cannot
help but observe a profound indignation in some of the language used by the
International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg.8 2
The judicial policy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia follows the same line, if perhaps somewhat more austerely.8 3  In
Africa, in the Kambanda case, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
considered it important to emphasize that the crimes against humanity particularly
shocked the conscience of mankind. m
80. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising From
the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 31 I.L.M. 1488, 1496 (1992) ("[T]he peremptory norms of general
international law and in particular respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the rights of
peoples and minorities, are binding on all parties to the succession."). See generally Alain Pellet, The
Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of
Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 178 (1992).
81. For example, the indictments and the current proceedings against Milosevic, Milutinovic, and
others for crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia.
82. "Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced."
NURNBERG JUDGMENT Vol. 1 223
83. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
38 I.L.M. 317, 346 (1999). The Tribunal clearly expressed a distaste for the criminal acts of the
defendant and for torture in general:
The treaty and customary rules referred to above impose obligations upon States and
other entities in an armed conflict, but first and foremost address themselves to the acts
of individuals, in particular to State officials or more generally, to officials of a party to
the conflict or else to individuals acting at the instigation or with the consent or
acquiescence of a party to the conflict. Both customary rules and treaty provisions
applicable in times of armed conflict prohibit any act of torture. Those who engage in
torture are personally accountable at the criminal level for such acts.
Id.
84. See International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda: Prosecutor v. Kambanda, 37 I.L.M. 1411,
1417 (1998) ("The Chamber holds that crimes against humanity, already punished by the Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals, and genocide, a concept defined later, are crimes which particularly shock the
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As Judge Bedjaoui noted, judicial decisions express law but they do not
completely neglect the moral climate. 5 A universal community of values
definitely exists in certain fields and the jus cogens is the quintessence of these
supreme, peremptory principles. Common values are born more easily and may
have more of an impact of judicial decision making when the number of the
countries concerned is limited, and especially when history and certain cultural
characteristics are shared among those countries. This factor is, then, generally
more developed and influential on a regional basis-namely European or Inter-
American. A shared community of values can be found, for example, behind the
affirmation of an absolute ban on the practice of torture, 6 or in the tolerance of
some behaviors earlier considered to be criminal in nature, or to stem from mental
health problems. 87
What is the role played by the science of international law in the phenomenon
of jurisprudential development? Without going into depth on this question it is
appropriate to observe that the contribution of the doctrine is mostly manifested in
abstracto8 8 and rarely ad hominem39
Do other scientific branches contribute to jurisprudential development? The
cases concerning the delimitation of continental shelves were impregnated with
geomorphologic and other scientific data,90 and in the case of the dispute over the
collective conscience.").
85. BEDJAOUI, MOHAMMED: L'OPPORTUNITE DANS LES DECISIONS DE LA COUR INTERNATIONALE
DE JUSTICE in BoiSSONS DE CHAZOURNES, L - GOWLAND-DEBBAS, V (EDS): THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST OF EQUITY AND UNIVERSALITY / L'ORDRE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONAL, UN
SYSTEME EN QUETE D'EQUITE ET D'UNIVERSALITE, LIBER AMICORUM GEORGES ABI-SAAB, KLUWER
580(2001).
86. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
38 I.L.M. 317, 346 (discussing various aspects of both customary and treaty law prohibiting torture);
Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. I (ser. A) at 14 (1978) ("[T]he prohibition contained in
article 3 is absolute and ... the Contracting States may not derogate from article 3 even in the event of
war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation.").
87. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149, 167. The Court
considered evolving social attitudes, particularly as reflected in domestic legislation, in its
determination that:
As compared with the era when that legislation [criminializing homosexual behavior]
was enacted, there is now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased
tolerance, of homosexual behaviour to the extent that in the great majority of the member
States of the Council of Europe it is no longer considered to be necessary or appropriate
to treat homosexual practices of the kind now in question as in themselves a matter to
which the sanctions of the criminal law should be applied; the Court cannot overlook the
marked changes which have occurred in this regard in the domestic law of the member
States.
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149, 167.
88. See, e.g., Manfred Lachs, Teachings and Teaching of International Law, 151 RECUEIL DES
COURS 218 (discussing the role of scholarship in international law).
89. See The Allusions of Arbitrator Rend-Jean Dupuy on the Teachings of Paul Guggenheim,
Charles de Visscher, Prosper Weil, Michel Virally, Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, Sir Gerald
Fitzmaurice, Georg Schwarzenberger et Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Texaco-Calasiatic v. Libya, 19 January
1977, J.D.I. 1977
90. See generally the cases concerning continental shelves, supra note 25. (discussing the exact
VOL. 31:3
2003 DEVELOPMENTS AND LIMITS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 479
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam,91 a considerable part of the memoranda (and the
replicas) as well as the oral pleadings were devoted to the presentation of scientific
research and the testimony of experts in the natural sciences.92 Similarly, in the
jurisprudence on the law of sea, the International Court of Justice has taken
scientific evidence into account 93 probably because of the ambiguity of the legal
rules. In the case of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam, however, the same tribunal
largely avoided such evidence because it was possible for the judges to decide the
dispute on the sole basis of the law of treaties, thus conforming to the rules of
procedure. 94
III. LIMITS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
A. Limits of a Legal Nature
The explicit limitations posed by treaty law should be considered first. The
existence of pertinent international treaties often prevents judges from formulating
jurisprudential developments. We can consider these types of treaties as a priori
imposed limits on jurisdictions. The actual applied formulae of decision-making,
whether precise or vague, can also be considered as limits of jurisprudential
development.
In its first judgment delivered in the Lawless case, the European Court of
Human Rights approved, without any hesitation, the theory of "acte claire".
95
extension and direction of continental shelves, the importance of submarine canyons, the issue of
geographical contiguity of the coast, and other scientific data).
91. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7.
92. See id. at 8. The list of technical experts is particularly illustrative. Id.
93. See Mohammed Bedjaoui, The "Manufacture" of Judgments at the International Court of
Justice, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 46 (1991). While Bedjaoui recognizes the difficulties inherent in the
voluminous pleadings of the parties, he also recognizes their potential benefits:
Would it then have been normal for the Court to have told the parties at a given point in
the oral arguments, "enough of geology and geomorphology!?" Perhaps, if the Court
had been absolutely sure of itself. But it has no right to certainties before hearing the
parties out. Listening has, after all, one very important function, which is to sow doubt,
to generate the philosophical "skepsis" which cleans out all preconception from the
Judge's mind before he embarks upon his ultimate function of decision.
Id.
94. See Rosalyn Higgins, Respecting Sovereign States and Running a Tight Courtroom, 50 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 121, 122 (2001) ("[Als both the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) and
the Spain-Canada Fisheries cases have shown, what one party terms an overriding environmental issue,
another sees as rather relating to treaty obligations, or the law of State responsibility, or the law of the
sea.").
95. See Lawless v. Ireland, I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 1, 28 (1960). Vis-;t-vis the habeas corpus
rule of the European Convention of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights emphasized
that:
The meaning thus arrived at by grammatical analysis is fully in harmony with the
purpose of the Convention which is to protect the freedom and security of the individual
against arbitrary detention or arrest .... [T]he Court cannot deny Article 5(1)(c) and (3)
the plain and natural meaning which follows both from the precise words used and from
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Elsewhere, recourse to the preparatory documents of a treaty (travaux
priparatoires) was felt appropriate-essentially in cases of obscure treaty
language.96 In the very first period of its practice, the European Court of Human
Rights rejected, under these limitations, the application of the European
Convention of Human Rights to problems of national or linguistic minorities.
(We have to add however, that the European Court of Human Rights later revised
that position, and its attitude became much more open as witnessed by the
judgments in the Buckley, Chapman, Serif, and Hassan & Chaush cases). 98  A
theoretical openness alone is already a considerable step forward, and is generally
the product of changed social and inter-social attitudes, but it cannot furnish an
absolute guarantee for a change in merito ofjurisprudential policy--certainly not if
the consensus of states is precarious or more political than legal, as can be
observed a series ofjudgments in Roma issues. 99
To find and to define a set of uniform European morals seems to be an
impossible mission. Without a common denominator at hand, States seek mostly
to preserve their margin of appreciation for other values, and the European Court
of Human Rights has often refused to go forward and build new jurisprudential
pillars. For example, in controversial cases such as those concerning the gay and
lesbian community, the European Court of Human Rights has been highly
cognizant of the moral climate and has taken pains to respect the limits imposed by
the diverging opinions of the states concerning minorities of different sexual
orientation.'00  In Europe, only one common principle exists in this field-a
the impression created by their context.
Id.
96. See Belgian Linguistic case, merits, supra note 9, at 282 (referring to the preparatory work of
the European Convention on Human Rights).
97. See id. (rejecting the application of the Convention).
98. See generally Buckley v. United Kingdom, App. No. 203848/92, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 101
(1996) (Court report); Chapman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 27238/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 399 (2001)
(Court report); Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561 (1999) (Court report); Hasan
and Chaush v. Bulgaria, App. No. 30985/96 34 Eur. H.R. 55 (2000) (Court report).
99. See, e.g., Chapman v. United Kingdom App. No. 27238/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 399, 428 (2001)
(Court report). Whether the adoption of the Framework Convention for the protection of national
minorities should give an impetus for the Court to go towards a renewal of its jurisprudential policy, the
judges emphasized:
[T]he Court is not persuaded that the consensus is sufficiently concrete for it to derive
any guidance as to the conduct or standards which Contracting States consider desirable
in any particular situation. The Framework Convention, for example, sets out general
principles and goals but signatory states were unable to agree on means or
implementation. This reinforces the Court's view that the complexity and sensitivity of
the issues involved in policies balancing the interests of the general population, in
particular with regard to environmental protection and the interests of a minority with
possibly conflicting requirements, renders the Court's role a strictly supervisory one.
Chapman v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 428.
See also Lee v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25289/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 677, 702-03 (Court report);
Beard v. United Kingdom, App. No. 24882/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442, 470 (2001) (Court report)
(employing the same wording).
100. See generally Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 149, 163-64 (1981)
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respect for the right to be different. Out of the application of this principle
emerges the jurisprudential concept that individual States are generally the best
positioned to determine the extent of gay rights within their own borders.' 0'
Limits can also be found in the principles of compromise, as can be observed
in the huge bodies of arbitral 0 2 and permanent jurisprudence. The Permanent
Court of International Justice expressed this rule for the first time in the Lotus
case 10 3 and the International Court of Justice has done so as well. 1' 4
Grosso modo the same principle can be found vis-A-vis advisory opinions.
The International Court of Justice is not bound to pronounce on questions which
are not raised in the original pleadings-even where certain states would like to
push the court to give an opinion on a particularly important but collateral issue. '05
(Court report); Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622, 631 (1990)
(Court report).
101. See, e.g., Frette v. France, merits (2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (last
visited Mar. 5, 2003). In section 41 of the judgment, the European Court of Human Rights addressed,
among other issues, the legal rights of gays and lesbians to adopt children, and largely differed to the
judgment of individual States:
It is indisputable that there is no common ground on the question. Although most of the
Contracting States do not expressly prohibit homosexuals from adopting where single
persons may adopt, it is not possible to find in the legal and social orders of the
Contracting States uniform principles on these social issues on which opinions within a
democratic society may reasonably differ widely. The Court considers it quite natural
that the national authorities, whose duty it is in a democratic society also to consider,
within the limits of their jurisdiction, the interests of society as a whole, should enjoy a
wide margin of appreciation when they are asked to make rulings on such matters. By
reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the
national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate
local needs and conditions. Since the delicate issues raised in the case, therefore, touch
on areas where there is little common ground amongst the member States of the Council
of Europe and, generally speaking, the law appears to be in a transitional stage, a wide
margin of appreciation must be left to the authorities of each State.
Id.
102. See, e.g., HYDE supra note 29, at 1626. Hyde observes that arbitrators have often limited
themselves to deciding only those questions explicitly put to them:
Secretary Bayard was correct in declaring in 1877, that an arbitrator should not assume
to decide any question other than that submitted to him by the States seeking his
judgment, or to take cognizance of any collateral issues between either of them and a
third State which was not expressly submitted to him by the States directly concerned.
Id.
103. See Lotus case (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 10, at 12 (Sept. 27) ("[T]he Court,
having obtained cognizance of the present case by notification of a special agreement concluded
between the Parties, it is rather to the terms of the agreement than to the submissions of the Parties that
the Court must have recourse establishing the precise points which it has to decide.").
104. See, e.g., Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. US.),
1984 1C.J. 246, 266 (Oct. 12).
105. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 236 (July 8). In the
nuclear context, for example, the court has found it unnecessary to consider some principles of
international humanitarian law, despite the urging of the parties:
It has been maintained in these proceedings that these principles and rules of
humanitarian law are part of jus cogens as defined in Article 53 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. The question whether a norm is part
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There are, of course, also legal limits other than treaty law, such as the
inherent powers of thejudiciary.
International tribunals (as well as national ones) try to follow the shortest and
the most logical path to a decision-at least according to their own theories. In their
judgments, judges may ignore those issues which have no direct connection to the
object of the dispute. They can do this despite the length of the memoranda or the
exhaustiveness of the pleadings submitted by the parties; courts can and do often
limit their considerations to issues which are dispositive to the outcome of the
dispute. No answer need be given to impertinent questions, and the court is not
obliged to follow the parties in all the directions suggested by them.1 6 The dictum
in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case provides a good example. 107 In the same
manner, the answer to sterile questions having a purely scientific interest'0 8 can be
economized, as was pointed out by Judge Shahabudden.'09
Jurisdictions also avoid passing judgment on documents having an uncertain
probative value or documents which are highly contradictory if the judges are not
convinced by either of the positions. 01 This is especially true if the dispute can be
settled without such documents, or when such a decision would have a negligible
effect on the merits of the case."'
Courts prefer to develop the rule of the case-and their jurisprudence-
slowly and carefully. Courts are not bound to answer any preliminary questions if
there is enough time to deal with them during the procedure on the merits and a
of thejus cogens relates to the legal character of the norm. The request addressed to the
Court by the General Assembly raises the question of the applicability of the principles
and rules of humanitarian law in cases of recourse to nuclear weapons and the
consequences of that applicability for the legality of recourse to these weapons. But it
does not raise the question of the character of the humanitarian law which would apply
to the use of nuclear weapons. There is, therefore, no need for the Court to pronounce
on this matter.
Id.
106. See, e.g., Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (Sept. 25) ("Nor
does the Court need to dwell upon the question of the relationship between the law of treaties and the
law of State responsibility, to which the Parties devoted lengthy arguments, as those two branches of
international law obviously have a scope that is distinct.").
107. See id. at 45-46.
108. See id. at 71 ("The Court does not find it necessary... to enter into a discussion of whether or
not Article 34 of the 1978 Convention [on the succession of States in treaties] reflects the state of
customary international law."). See also Northern Cameroons (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 35
("The Court does not find it necessary to pronounce an opinion on these points which, in so far as
concerns the operation or administration of the trusteeship is no longer in existence, and no
determination reached by the court could be given effect to by the former administering authority.").
109. See MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 219 (1990).
110. See, e.g. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 1996 I.C.J. 595, 619 (July 11); Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561,
570 (1999) (Court report).
I 11. E.g., Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 1996 I.C.J. 595, 619 (July 11); Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 561,
570 (1999) (Court report). In both of these cases, the Courts avoided pronouncing on the eventual legal
validity of the minority protecting instruments of the League of Nations. Id.
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decision on that particular point is not a sine qua non condition of the provisory
measures." 2  Even the principle Kompetenz-Kompetenz has been used by
international tribunals in order to avoid highly political issues" 3 or questions not
vital to a resolution of the issues. 1
4
We can also find good examples of a statutory approach to self-limitation in
interstate disputes' 1 as well as in advisory opinions."16 There are especially good
examples in the United Nations staff litigation cases." 
7
Another jurisprudential limitation can be observed in the fact that tribunals
112. See, e.g., Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 15.
The International Court of Justice declined to decide upon certain questions which it saw as non-
dispositive:
[Tihe Court is not called upon to determine any of the other questions which have been
raised before it in the present proceedings, including the question of its jurisdiction to
entertain the merits of the case; and whereas the decision given in these proceedings in
no way prejudges any such question, and leaves unaffected the rights of the Government
of Libya and the Government of the United Kingdom to submit arguments in respect of
any of these questions... the Court finds that the circumstances of the case are not such
as to require the exercise of its power under Article 41 of the Statute to indicate
provisional measures. Id.
See also Legality of the Use of Force (Yug. v. Fr.), 1999 I.C.J. 363, 374 (June 2) (assessing the
separability of the jurisdictional issues from the merits of the case).
113. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion No. 5, Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5 at 27,
29 ("[T]he Court, being a Court of Justice, cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the
essential rules guiding their activity as a Court.").
114. See Agean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3, 16-17. The Court managed
to avoid pronouncing on the legal validity of the 1928 General Act of the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes because "it is evident that any pronouncement of the Court as to the status of the
1928 Act whether it were found to be a Convention in force or to be no longer in force, may have
implications in the relations between States other then Greece and Turkey." Id.
115. See Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yug.) 1993 I.C.J.
325, 344 (Sept.13). The Court implicitly refused to adjudge the legality or the opportunity of the
Security Council's arms embargo, hampering Bosnia from exercising self-defense:
The Court may, for the preservation of those rights, indicate provisional measures to be
taken by the parties, but not by third States or other entities who would not be bound by
the eventual judgment to recognize and respect those rights; whereas consequently the
Court cannot, in the exercise of its power to indicate provisional measures, indicate by
way of "clarification" that those States or entities should take, or refrain from, specific
action in relation to the acts of genocide which the Applicant alleges are being
committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Id.
116. See, e.g., International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 140 (July 11) ("The
Court is however, unable to deduce from these general considerations any legal obligation for
mandatory States to conclude or to negotiate such [trusteeship] agreements. It is not for the Court to
pronounce on the political or moral duties which these considerations may involve.").
117. See, e.g., Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation
Upon Complaints made Against the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
1956 I.C.J. 77, 99 (Oct. 23). This phenomenon is manifested much more often in the United Nations
staff litigation cases in order to preserve the respective roles of the administrative tribunals and the
International Court of Justice. The Court has said, for example, that "a challenge of a decision
confirming jurisdiction cannot properly be transformed into a procedure against the manner in which
jurisdiction has been exercised or against the substance of the decision." Id.
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are generally rather reluctant to pronounce on the decisions of another tribunal,
particularly when the object of a dispute is to nullify or to maintain an arbitral
award. 1 8
Judicial caution, the reluctance of judges, or a desire to preserve the
coherence of a firmly established jurisprudence often operates as a well-founded
theoretical obstacle to development.1 9 Despite the aesthetic beauty of a logical
construction, we cannot forget the underlying consideration that preserving
jurisprudential coherence is the best way to maintain the states' confidence-a
necessary condition for bringing future disputes before the courts. 120 Even in cases
of the compulsory jurisdiction of certain courts-for example, the reform of the
European Convention of Human Rights-the preservation of jurisprudential
heritage remains particularly important.'
12
The influence of auxiliary documents is limited; the International Court of
Justice, for example, generally refuses to base a decision on geographical maps. 122
118. See, e.g., Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 214
(Nov. 18). The Court explained, "the [arbitral] award is not subject to appeal and the Court cannot
approach the considerations of the objections raised by Nicaragua to the validity of the Award as a
Court of Appeal. The Court is not called upon to pronounce whether the arbitrator's decision was right
or wrong." Id.
119. See, e.g., Northern Cameroons, (Cameroon v. U.K.), 1963 I.C.J. 15, 29 (Dec. 2) ("There are
inherent limitations on the exercise of the judicial function which the Court, as a Court of Justice, can
never ignore... the Court itself, and not the parties, must be the guardian of the Court's judicial
integrity."
120. See, e.g., Leo Gross, The International Court of Justice and the United Nations, 120 RECUEIL
DES COuRs 341 (1967) ("[T]he Court may refuse to give an opinion if the question is not a legal one
and even refuse to give an opinion if 'the circumstances of the case are of such a character as should
lead it to decline to answer the Request."'). But see, Elihu Lauterpacht, The Development of the Law of
International Organization by the Decisions of International Tribunals, 152 RECUEIL DES COURS 466
(1976). Lauterpacht questions whether the body of decisions by the International Court of Justice
concerning international organizations amounts to any coherent jurisprudence:
[W]e are bound to ask whether the treatment by the Court of questions relating to international
organizations-and especially the interpretation of their constitutions-represents a deliberate or
consistent attempt to develop a systematic approach to the law of international organization as such.
Or, is it, on the other hand nothing more than an accumulation of judicial episodes which share the
common feature of being founded upon facts of an "organizational" character and which happens only
accidentally or haphazardly to shed light on the legal system of international organization?
Id.
121. See, e.g., Franz Matscher, Quarante Ans D'activitis de la Cour Europdenne des Droits de
L 'Homme, 270 RECUEIL DES COURs 283 (1997).
122. See, e.g., Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 582 (Dec. 22). The court
made clear that maps are usually regarded only as prima facie evidence and are rarely dispositive:
Maps merely constitute information which varies in accuracy from case to case; of
themselves, and by virtue solely of their existence, they cannot constitute a territorial
title, that is, a document endowed by international law with intrinsic legal force for the
purpose of establishing territorial rights. Of course, in some cases maps may acquire
such legal force, but where this is so the legal force does not arise solely from their
intrinsic merits: it is because such maps fall into the category of physical expressions of
the will of the State or States concerned. This is the case, for example, when maps are
annexed to an official text of which they form an integral part. Except in this clearly
defined case, maps are only extrinsic evidence of varying reliability or unreliability
VOL. 31:3
2003 DEVELOPMENTS AND LIMITS IN INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 485
However, in some cases, it has considered such maps where both parties have
submitted them. On other occasions, it has refused to invalidate an arbitral award
because one of the parties simply lacked a map to support its argument.'1
2 3
Acts and behavior of the parties can also serve as limits for on the
development of jurisprudence. If the parties do not ask the Court to provide an
explanation on a given legal question, despite the fact that the question is important
to the merits of the case, the judges are not bound to address the issue.' 24 In the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, for example, the International Court of Justice could
avoid pronouncing on the eventual jus cogens nature (or at least the current stage
of the metamorphosis of a norm of jus cogens in statu nascendi) of environmental
protection. 125 Despite the logic in such a deduction, one cannot forget the suddenly
proclaimed examples of erga omnes norms in the Barcelona Traction case.
26
B. Non-Legal Limitations
The absence of information and the inaccessibility of information thought
necessary for the background of a judgment have also been evoked as motives for
refusing to make a decision, or refusing to extrapolate decisions with major legal
consequences from incomplete facts, or to use such information to take a new and
delicate direction. The advisory opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons127 and some aspects of the case concerning military activities in
which may be used, along with other evidence of a circumstantial kind, to establish or
reconstitute the real facts.
Id.
But see, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1099 (Dec.13). In this case, the
court pointed out that the parties themselves had treated maps as evidence of little value:
The Court considers that, in the light of that disagreement, there cannot be any
question of the authorities concerned having accepted the maps then available in
a manner capable of constituting "subsequent practice in the application of the
[1890] treaty," still less recognition of the boundary shown on those maps. To
the contrary, it appears to the Court that the parties largely ignored the maps,
which they regarded as either accurate or inaccurate according to their respective
positions on the course of the boundary.
Id.
123. See, e.g., Arbitral Award of July 3, 1988 (Guinea-Bissau v. Sen.), 1991 I.C.J. 53, 74 ("In the
circumstances of the case, the absence of a map cannot in any event constitute such an irregularity as
would render the [arbitral] Award invalid."); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J.
1045, 1071 (Dec. 13) (finding no viable conclusions could be drawn from the cartographic evidence
offered by the parties).
124. See LaGrand case (Germany v. United States) 27 June 2001 ICJ Reports § 98.
125. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 67 (Sept. 25) ("Neither of
the Parties contended that new peremptory norms of environmental law had emerged since the
conclusion of the 1977 Treaty, and the Court will consequently not be required to examine the scope of
Article 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."); LaGrand case, supra note 124, at § 98.
126. See Barcelona Traction, Light, and Power (Belg. v. Spain), 1979 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). The
case is well known for its characterization of slavery and genocide as criminal acts erga omnes, though
the pronouncement had nothing to do with the merits of the case, which centered on diplomatic
protection of corporation.
127. See Legality of the Use or Threat of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 237 (July 8). The
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Nicaragua are examples of such jurisprudential behavior. 128
Major social changes also encourage international tribunals to curb their
jurisprudential developments, and a particular legal heritage can have a similar
effect. Despite the philosophy developed in Tyrer v. United Kingdom, the
European Court of Human Rights has considered some local particularities-
namely historical ones-in some of its decisions. 129 For example, in refusing to
apply the theory professed by some schools that a policeman is only a man in
uniform, the European Court of Human Rights recognized the importance of
maintaining a distance between police and political parties because of the historical
role, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, of the police and army within
totalitarian communist regimes.
130
Does the science of international law have any restrictive influence on the
decision-making of international tribunals? As Judge Bedjaoui noted, the
existence and the attention of the academic community of international lawyers
considerably limit the subjectivism of tribunals.' 3 1 The manifest preference of the
Court felt unable to rule on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons in all circumstances:
Nor can the Court make a determination on the validity of the view that the recourse to
nuclear weapons would be illegal in any circumstance owing to their inherent and total
incompatibility with the law applicable in armed conflict.., the Court considers that it
does not have sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law
applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.
Id.
128. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 125. ("Since the Court
has no information as to the interpretation in fact given to the Congress decision, or as to whether
intelligence information is in fact still being supplied to the contras, it will limit itself to a declaration as
to how the law applies in this respect.").
129. See Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. I (ser. A) at 13-14 (1978.
130. See, e.g., Rekvenyi v. Hungary, App. No. 25390/94 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 519, 522 (1999) (Court
report). The Court recognized that:
In view of the particular history of some Contracting States, the national authorities of
these States may, so as to ensure the consolidation and maintenance of democracy,
consider it necessary to have constitutional safeguards to achieve this aim by restricting
the freedom of police officers to engage in political activities and, in particular, political
debate.
Id.
131. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUi, L'OPPORTUNITE DANS LES DECISIONS DE LA COUR
INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE 569. Bedjaoui asserts:
Ce qui limite grandement la part non pas de "subjectivitd", mdme au meilleur sens, mais
de "particularisme acquis de ses origines et de son dducation, c'est le regard attentif et
critique des "transmetteurs de normes" ("rule-transmitters"): les colldgues de travail
d'abord, les Etats parties au proc s ensuite, et enfin toute la profession juridique
internationale. 11 demeure aussi sous le regard de l'dlite juridique de son pays d'origine,
qui attend confusdment de lui d'etre le promoteur de sa culture juridique nationale; mais
cela se mele et se croise aussi avec le regard des autres juristes du monde, frdquent6s
dans les forums intemationaux et aupr~s desquels il tient A conserver sa reputation. I! est
aussi a l'dcoute des Acaddmies savantes, des Organisations internationales, des hauts
fonctionnaires internationaux et des membres des corps diplomatiques, particuli~rement
ceux du Siege de la Cour et ceux du Siege des Nations Unies.
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International Court of Justice to the notion of erga omnes norms instead of jus
cogens can be explained by the division of the scientific community on the utility
and operability of the theory ofjus cogens. 132
The International Court of Justice has often distanced itself from non-juridical
sciences in order to avoid that exterior considerations should exercise too great an
influence on its decision-making. This is reflected, for example, in the court's
attitude towards geography and ecology.'3 3  For example, though the parties
submitted a considerable number of calculations and analyses on the safety or
potentially dangerous character of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam, the
International Court of Justice explained that "it is not necessary in order to respond
to the questions put to it in the Special Agreement for it to determine which of
those points of view is scientifically better founded."'
134
Reading scientific articles and books written by judges, one can often be left
with the impression of their authors' conviction that masses of technical dossiers
often have a counter-productive effect. 3  The European Court of Human Rights
has also been rather hesitant to come down on either side when it observes a
division in the views of scholars on a particular issue. 1
36
132. Elisabeth Zoller, Elisabeth L'Affaire du Personnel Diplomatique et Consulaire des Etats-Unis
A Th6ran (Etats-Unis d'Amdrique c. Iran) Arr8t du 24 mars 1980 RGDIP 1980/4 1024. Zoller notes:
La question de savoir si les principes du droit international qui r6gissent les relations diplomatiques et
consulaires participent de la notion dejus cogens, ne trouve pas de solution dans l'arret. II est possible
que la Cour ait prdfdrd laisser le probleme en l'dtat, le contenu de cette notion dtant trop imprdcis.
Id.
133. See Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1068 (Dec. 13) ("The Court is
not in a position to reconcile the figures submitted by the Parties, who take a totally different approach
to the definition of the channels concerned.").
134. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 42 (Sept. 25).
135. See Bedjaoui, supra note 93, at 37 ("The weight of documentation does not necessarily
correspond to the weight of the arguments, for at least two-thirds of the bulk consists of annexes, that is,
texts produced in support of the contentions sustained in the pleadings."); See also Higgins, supra note
94, at 129. Higgins argues:
In recent years, the dossier for each case has undoubtedly got larger and larger. In
technical cases, understandably, long and detailed technical reports are appended
(Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project and Botswana/Namibia afford recent examples).
Moreover, there has been a tendency to append every possible scrap of paper, however
marginal to the outcome. The translation costs for the Court were becoming prodigious
and indeed the necessity to translate these thousands of pages of documentary annexes
was beginning to dictate the pace at which cases could be heard.
Id.
136. See, e.g., Frette v. France, merits (2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc (last
visited Mar. 5, 2003). In section 42 of the judgment, the Court declined, to make any findings as to the
consequences of being adopted by homosexual parents based on the scientific evidence presented,
noting that "[uit must be observed that the scientific community-particularly experts on childhood,
psychiatrists and psychologists-is divided over the possible consequences of a child's being adopted
by one or more homosexual parents, especially bearing in mind the limited number of scientific studies
conducted on the subject to date." Id.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
As a conclusion to the above presentation-however rudimentary--of the
most often used reasons for jurisprudential development or jurisprudential
limitation, it can be observed that in the practices of international tribunals as a
whole, the same considerations are evoked as justifications for both expanding and
keeping in check jurisprudential evolution.
Thus, the judges' freedom may be based on reasons derived from the ex ante
will of states, manifested at different points in international conventions, submitted
for adjudication before an international tribunal. Or that freedom can be linked to
the acts of states or parties to the dispute. This freedom may also be recognized by
judges on the basis of the theory, practice, or functionality at work in a particular
jurisdiction. We can refer also to Bedjaoui's words comparing judicial opportunity
to the effect of yeast in cooking. 137
What are the reasons judges give to explain their reluctance to formulate new
jurisprudence? These reasons can be found in the will of states, reflected in
conventions, treaties, or in procedural acts. The perception of proper judicial
functions is equally important, not only vis-A-vis usages and customs but, first and
foremost, according to the requirements of the position enjoyed by a given
international organization.
Apparently, there are other-probably less frequently occurring-motives as
well.
Was the eighteenth century French grand chancellor Henri-Franqois
d'Aguesseau right or wrong when exclaiming, "judges of the Earth, you are
Gods!" long before the creation of international tribunals?
Who is, in the final analysis, an international judge? An administrator or a
creator? A serf, a professor or a prophet? Can he be all of them at the same time?
In conclusion, we may observe that the developments and limits of
international justice can be conceived in a quadrangular system where the corners
are the following:
primo: judicial logic;
secundo: organic-functional imperative;
tertio: social necessity; and
quarto: the ambiguous "plus," or incalculable factor of irrationality that we
can call also a divine sparkle.
The order of their enumeration also reflects, however, the importance that we
should attribute to these factors. International jurisdiction and international
jurisprudence are neither automatisms, nor a lottery-they are a complex of social
phenomena, activity and science with all the precisions and lacunas, certainties and
uncertainties, that such a statement presumes.
137. See BEDJAOUI, supra note 131, at 583.
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This dialectic interrelation-the faculty of limited creativity, according to
Judge Shahabuddeen's observations 3 8-was well described by former President of
the International Court of Justice, Gilbert Guillaume, when he observed,
"[lInternational law is our common heritage from the nineteenth through the
twentieth centuries. It should evolve with the time. It must be adapted to local and
regional needs. But it must not be broken."'1
39
138. MOHAMMED SHAHABUDDEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 232 (1990).
139. Guillaume, Gilbert: La Cour internationale de Justice - Quelques propositions concretes A
I'occasion du cinquantenaire RGDIP 1996/2 331-32 ("Le droit international est I'hritage commun que
nous avons re~u du XIXe si~cle et du XXe si6cle. II doit A l'6vidence dvoluer avec le temps. II doit
aussi s'adapter aux besoins locaux et r~gionaux. Mais ne doit pas 8tre brisd.").

